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Introduction
"It is the policy of the American Economic Review to publish papers only if the data used in the analysis are clearly and precisely documented and are readily available to any researcher for purposes of replication. Authors of accepted papers that contain empirical work, simulations, or experimental work must provide to the Review, prior to publication, the data, programs, and other details of the computations su¢ cient to permit replication. These will be posted on the AER Web site." 1 Data sharing is an essential feature for the scienti…c principle of credibility, replication and further research. It guarantees that research methods used to produce the results are known and that incorrect results can be withdrawn from the cumulative body of knowledge (Anderson et al., 2008; Dewald et al., 1986; Vlaeminck and Wagner, 2014) . Also, replicable research fosters learning and thus facilitates the development of subsequent research, which boosts scienti…c advancement. However, whereas a large majority of researchers seems to recognize the importance of data sharing, they are reluctant to apply this principle in practice (Nelson, 2009) . Recently, some of the major economics journals have introduced mandatory data disclosure policies which require authors to share their data prior to publication. While these policies provide a strong institutional response in order to overcome low data sharing rates they may have detrimental e¤ects for researchers. Authors who invest in costly data generation, e.g., collecting data and programming, are not the full residual claimants of the data after the …rst publication and might decrease their initial e¤ort to generate it. In addition, they may strategically delay the submission of papers in order to fully exploit their data. In contrast, disclosed data might increase the value of a publication for its author by increasing its credibility. It may also generate positive e¤ects for the scienti…c community as the data could be used for subsequent research and validation.
In this paper we …rst derive the optimal e¤ort choices to generate data under di¤erent data policies. We then compare the optimal e¤ort choices and publication strategies (no delay versus strategic delay) across di¤erent policies in order to derive welfare implications. We set up a three-stage model of publication and data disclosure to analyze the interaction between a data-creating researcher and a competing researcher and study the incentive and welfare e¤ects of data disclosure. The former researcher exerts e¤ort to create the data in the initial stage. She may then either publish her paper(s) sequentially in the next two stages or altogether in the last stage to avoid self-induced competition associated with disclosed data. Our motivating example is a researcher who exerts e¤ort to create a unique (possibly hand-collected) data set in order to pursue a novel research agenda, i.e., a set of papers using the same data. This researcher chooses the e¤ort to create data in the initial stage of the model, the number of papers written based on the data and whether and when to share the data with the research community. These decisions depend on the data availability policy of journals. Under No Policy, i.e., the status quo of most journals in economics, the creator of data can freely choose whether and when to share the data and whether to write one or two papers using the data. Following Dasgupta and David (1994) , who emphasize that an institutional response is necessary to overcome the gap between researchers'demand for data sharing and its voluntary provision, we consider a second policy type, the First Paper Policy. The leading example is the data availability policy of the American Economic Association, which forces the creator of data to share the data after the …rst publication so that the data is available to the other researcher.
The creator of the data has a strong incentive to protect the competitive advantage associated with the data, as she might bene…t from using the data for subsequent research and keep the data secret until their private value is fully exploited (Anderson et al., 2008; Haeussler, 2011; Haeussler et al., 2014; Stephan, 1996) . If the data is kept private, another researcher cannot use it for replication or for subsequent research. The model endogenizes the decision to strategically delay the time of publication and thus the disclosure of data under the First Paper Policy. We derive exact conditions for positive welfare e¤ects of mandatory data disclosure. However, we also …nd that the transition to mandatory data disclosure has negative welfare properties if it induces the data-creating researcher to delay her submissions strategically. In general, the welfare e¤ects depend on the cost to generate data, the impatience of a researcher to publish (discount factor) and the additional value created by sharing data both for the data-creating researcher and the competing researcher.
Several top-tier economics journals have recently adopted mandatory data disclosure policies. However, the vast majority of economics journals either do not have a data availability policy or are reluctant to enforce it (McCullough, 2009; McCullough and Vinod, 2003) . In addition, Andreoli-Versbach and Mueller-Langer (forthcoming) provide evidence for the status quo in economics with respect to voluntary data sharing using 488 observations randomly taken from researchers'academic webpages and public data repositories. Out of the sample, 435 researchers (89.14%) neither have a data and code section nor indicate whether and where their data is available. 8.81% of researchers share some of their data whereas only 2.05% fully share. Also, Anderson et al. (2008) suggest that authors generally hesitate to share their data and code despite their pre-publication commitment to provide this infor-mation. This may suggest that editors, referees and readers are con…dent that the empirical results presented in the papers are always credible and robust. Unfortunately this is not the case (Lacetera and Zirulia, 2011) . Empirical economics articles can often not be replicated (Dewald et al., 1986; McCullough et al., 2006 and 2008) . This raises great concerns regarding the credibility and reliability of empirical work.
In a recent and heavily debated 2 article Angrist and Pischke (2010, p. 3) argue that better research design and the consequent causal interpretation of the regression coe¢ cients "is taking the con out of econometrics". Even though the identi…cation strategy is essential for good empirical work, without the possibility of replication and extension, which is provided by sharing the data and codes, doubts 3 about the credibility of empirical work remain.
In addition, researchers who do subsequent research have to develop the data themselves if the data are not shared, resulting in a (socially wasteful) duplication of research e¤orts. Open access to research data may on the one hand increase the credibility of authors as their work might be replicated by others and on the other hand facilitates new research as both data and codes would be readily available (McCullough and Vinod, 2003) . 4 Even though most scholars agree that there are bene…ts of data sharing this view is not unanimous. A common objection to making data and code available is o¤ered by Mo¢ tt (2007) and McCullough (2009, p. 124):
"Economists call the 'patent' problem the problem that those who put the e¤ort into constructing a data set and writing programs (months of work) have the right to use it for further research for X years."
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up a simple two-player three-stage model of data disclosure. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of di¤erent data disclosure policies on optimal e¤ort and data sharing behaviour. In Section 4 we study the ambiguous welfare e¤ects of mandatory data disclosure. Section 5 provides policy recommendations and Section 6 concludes our study.
A Simple Model of Data Disclosure
This model analyzes the optimal e¤ort choices of a researcher, R, to generate novel data and to share the data produced with the scienti…c community, which is represented by a second researcher, C, who may use the data for subsequent research. We consider a threestage model, t = 0; 1; 2, where the incentives to share depend on two factors. First, data disclosure may increase the value of a published article for R, e.g., it may increase the credibility of the article. Second, disclosure may change R's personal value of the data after the last publication. For instance, the loss of control of disclosed data may lead to ‡awed interpretation of the data, which may negatively a¤ect R's reputation and thus her personal value of the data after the last publication. We study two data availability policies of journals. Under No Policy (henceforth N P ), R can freely choose whether and when to share the data and whether to write one or two papers using the data. In contrast, the First Paper Policy (F P P ) forces R to share the data after the …rst publication so that the data is available to C. For simplicity, we consider a maximum number of two journal publications that a single researcher can achieve by using the same data set. We assume that the marginal bene…t from the re-use of the data is decreasing and that the returns to publication are diminishing with increased output (Tuckman and Leahey, 1973) . Under both policies, R chooses e¤ort e 0 to create a data set in the initial stage. The quality and the value of the data set and the publication increase in this initial e¤ort. Thereby, it also a¤ects R's decision to disclose the data and the quality of published articles which are derived from the data. R's e¤ort to publish is given by e 1 in the …rst stage and by e 2 in the second stage. As Figure 1 illustrates, there are six possibilities, four under N P and two under F P P . Under N P , R may choose to (1) publish one paper and share in t = 1 (1-Share), (2) publish two subsequent papers in t = 1 and t = 2 and share in t = 2 (2-Share), (3) write one paper in t = 1 and never share (1-Never) and (4) publish two subsequent papers and never share . Under F P P , R may (5) choose to publish the …rst paper in t = 1 while being forced to share the data. In stage 2, C will then choose e¤ort x 2 and publish a paper using R's data (No Strategic Delay). (6) R may strategically delay the …rst publication in order to evade the forced disclosure of data and publish two papers in t = 2 (Strategic Delay). By "strategic delay" we mean that a researcher does not submit her papers one after another but all at the same time after the completion of the second paper in order to maintain the exclusive use of the data. Figure 1 : Stages of the model Figure 1 illustrates a set of six reasonable publication strategies for R under the two data policies under study. For instance, R's decision to write one or two papers depends on the value of the data for subsequent use. In addition, R's decision to disclose or withhold data depends on her personal value of the data after the last publication. For instance, data disclosure may increase R's personal value of the data, e.g., due to subsequent use in data-journals. However, it may also be the case that the data has a higher value for R if it remains her private information. For instance, loss of control associated with data sharing can result in data falsi…cation or ‡awed interpretation that may negatively a¤ect R's reputation (Costello, 2009; Perrino et al., 2013) . Thus, even though we assume that data disclosure always has a positive e¤ect on the value of the published article that is based on this data, withholding the data after the …nal publication may be the optimal strategy for R in our model.
No Policy

First Paper Policy
Let v be the value of a research idea that is generated by the scienti…c community based on R's data. Let > 1 be a creativity coe¢ cient that measures the superior creativity of the scienti…c community as compared to the single researcher R. This is an important assumption as it implicitly states that the social optimum could be reached if the research was done by C. The intuition for this assumption is that C would achieve the highest value of research when he initially creates the data and writes both articles. In our model, however, R initially produces the data and writes (at least) the …rst paper. For instance, we assume that R has the initial research idea together with exclusive access to data sources that give him a head start in the creation of data. Following Fudenberg et al. (1983) 5 , we argue that this head start enables R to preempt C from generating data (as well as publication as long as the data are private information). A time coe¢ cient, c > 1, indicates that the value of the second idea based on the data is lower than that of the …rst idea. Let v and v c be the value of the idea for R based on the data in stage 1 and 2, respectively. Henceforth, we normalize v to one. The higher c is, the stronger does the value of the idea based on the data devaluate. Let 1 c be the value of the idea based on the data for C in the second stage. As > 1, 1 c > 1 c . Thus, data availability creates positive spillovers as it enables C to publish an article of higher value as compared to R's second article under non-disclosure.
The cost functions are given by c (e t ) = 1 2 e 2 t for R and c (x 2 ) = 1 2 x 2 2 for C, i.e., we assume increasing marginal costs of both data and article creation. Without data no research occurs and players get U i;k m j = 0 with players i = R; C , policies k = N P; F P P , number of papers published j = 1; 2 and (in case that k = N P ) R's sharing decision m = share; never. Welfare is given by W k m j = U R;k m j + U C;k m j . We will derive the optimal e¤ort levels both for the data and paper creation. Then we will compare the total utility generated by R and C under di¤erent data disclosure policies in order to evaluate the policy implications of each regulation. We start by describing the setup of the model and the interaction between R and C under N P and under F P P . Then we will evaluate changes in the welfare function caused by a policy change from N P to F P P .
No Policy
In stage 0, R chooses e¤ort e 0 to create the data. In stage 1, R chooses e¤ort e 1 to publish the …rst paper that elaborates on the data and decides whether to share the data with the scienti…c community. In stage 2, there are two possibilities. First, if R does not share data in stage 1, she chooses e¤ort e 2 to publish a second paper with the same data and whether to share the data with the scienti…c community. Second, if R shares the data in stage 1, C chooses e¤ort x 2 to publish a paper by using R's data. R bene…ts from keeping the data private information. This exclusive use may increase R's ex ante incentives to exert e¤ort on the data creation and preparation, which is an essential part of empirical economics. The higher R's initial e¤ort to create the data, the higher are her bene…ts from the journal article that is based on the data. However, the scienti…c community, C, would bene…t if R shares the data. The bene…ts consist of the replicability of the results, further research without the costs of data duplication and better research ideas and methods as the data and codes are shared among a large community. The fundamental di¤erence between the two researchers is that R has a data set which would be valuable for C, but C cannot in ‡uence R's decision when to share the data as there is no market for the exchange of data. The assumption that there is no market for data is very plausible in economics. The only market for data in economics is between institutions and researchers but not between researchers. Thus there is no monetary incentive to share the data and an e¢ cient allocation of e¤orts not achievable (Coase, 1960 ).
Researcher publishes one paper and shares at t = 1 (1-Share): Appendix A (B) provides all calculations for the N P (F P P ) scenario. R's optimization problem under 1-Share is
where t is the discount factor at time t which measures R's impatience to publish. For instance, this impatience arises from the researcher's ambition to push her academic career by obtaining tenure through publication (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Gans and Stern, 2010) . To illustrate, for = 1, R is indi¤erent between a publication today and a publication tomorrow.
represents the change of the value of an article due to the disclosure of the data. We assume that is positive and not too large, 0 < 1 2 . For instance, suppose that the availability of the data used in an article is perceived by peers as a signal of quality (Dasgupta and David, 1994) . In that sense, data sharing may be seen as a means to disclose R's private information on the quality of her empirical article. Thus, researchers of higher quality may be more likely to share their data voluntarily in order to signal the robustness of their results (Andreoli-Versbach and Mueller-Langer, forthcoming; Feigenbaum and Levy, 1993). In addition, empirical articles for which the applied data is publicly available may generate more citations. Let D ( N D ) measure the value of the data for R after the last publication if R discloses (does not disclose) the data and de…ne = D N D . For instance, the data set might contain information that is valuable for non-or semi-academic projects, such as expert or policy advice, that do not necessarily lead to further scienti…c publications. Second, the data set itself might be cited in subsequent literature as it provides, for instance, a widely applicable index. In addition, a data set could become valuable if data journals are later established in economics. In these cases, the remaining personal value of the data after the last publication depends on whether the data are public or private information. The lower the lower are ceteris paribus R's incentives to share data. The higher the scope for individual use of the data, the higher will be R's incentives to keep the data. The …rst term in (1) is R's discounted net value from publishing in t = 1. It is given by the di¤erence between the individual gross value from publishing and the e¤ort cost to write the paper. The individual gross value from publishing depends positively on the e¤ort to create the data, the e¤ort to write the paper and . The second term is R's discounted value of the disclosed data set, which depends positively on the e¤ort to create it. The third term describes the e¤ort cost to create the data.
C's optimization problem under 1-Share depends on R's optimal e¤ort to create data, e 0;N P share 1 , and is given by:
Hence, C maximizes his discounted net value from publishing in t = 2, i.e. the gross value from publishing in t = 2 minus the e¤ort cost to write the paper. We obtain the following optimal e¤orts: e 0;N P share
c . Henceforth, we only consider positive optimal e¤orts and assume 1 > 1 2 (1 + ) 2 . 6 Optimal e¤orts in all stages are increasing in D and . The higher the value of the article and the data due to data disclosure, the higher is R's initial e¤ort to create the data, e 0;N P share 1 . Optimal e¤orts chosen by C and R in stages 1 and 2 then depend on R's initial e¤ort of data creation. The higher the quality of the data, the higher is the bene…t from an article and thus the higher are the e¤orts to publish it. We obtain the following utilities for R's utility depends positively on the remaining personal value of the data after the last publication. It also increases if the positive -e¤ect on the value of the article due to the disclosure of the data is more pronounced. C's utility increases if, at optimum, R increases his e¤ort to create the data. It decreases if the devaluation of the value of the research idea based on R's data over time is more pronounced. Overall welfare is given by
. It is rising in D and and decreasing in c. Overall welfare is also decreasing in the inferiority of R's research idea as compared to C's research idea, which is measured by the creativity coe¢ cient . Note that, as the data is shared after the …rst stage, C publishes the second article. Sharing data after the …rst stage creates positive spillovers as data now can be used to extract the highest value of subsequent research.
Researcher publishes two subsequent papers and shares at t = 2 (2-Share): R's optimization problem under 2-Share is
The …rst term in (3) is the discounted net value of publishing in t = 1. Therein, the gross value of publishing is given by e 0 e 1 1 (1 + ) and e¤ort cost are given by 1 2 e 2 1 . Note that in contrast to 1-Share, the positive -e¤ect is discounted under 2-Share as data availability develops its positive e¤ect on the value of the …rst article at a later stage. The second term in (3) is the discounted net value of publishing in t = 2. Therein, the gross value of publishing is given by e 0 e 2 1 c (1 + ). It accounts for the devaluation of the research idea over time. The third term is R's discounted value of the disclosed data set. The last term describes the e¤ort cost to create the data. Again, we only consider positive optimal e¤orts, 1
We obtain the following optimal e¤orts:
. We obtain the following utility of R, which is equal to overall welfare as C does not generate any utility in this case:
D . Overall welfare increases in D and and decreases in c and .
Researcher publishes one paper in t = 1 and never shares (1-Never): The optimization problem of R is given by
In contrast to 1-Share, there is no positive -e¤ect in the …rst term of (4). The second term is R's discounted value of the undisclosed data set. We obtain the following optimal e¤orts: e 0;N P never 
7 Note that if R does not share the data immediately after her last publication, she will never share.
We obtain the following optimal e¤orts: e 0;N P never N D . Note that C does not generate any utility in this case. From the optimal e¤orts under the four N P scenarios, we obtain:
Proposition 0: Positive e¤orts condition All optimal e¤orts are well-de…ned and positive for all
All proofs are provided in Appendix C. However, straightforward proofs are omitted. We now analyze the conditions under which R does not share her data. (i) Intuitively, R does not have an incentive to share data if the remaining personal value of the undisclosed data after the last publication by far exceeds the personal value of the disclosed data. In this case, the disclosure-driven decrease in the remaining value of the data more than outweighs the positive " -e¤ect" associated with the increase in the value of an article due to data disclosure. Note that (i) illustrates the status quo in economics as only very few economists voluntarily share their data with the scienti…c community (Andreoli-Versbach and Mueller-Langer, forthcoming). (ii) However, this result does not hold true in general if the above-stated decrease in the remaining value of the data is su¢ ciently low, i.e. > l . Then, the level of patience comes into play and only a su¢ ciently impatient researcher will keep the data private information. In this case, the (strongly) discounted " -e¤ect" does not outweigh the disclosure-driven decrease in the remaining value of the data.
Finally, note that, for 1, 1-Never (2-Never) would be strictly dominated by 1-Share (2-Share).
First Paper Policy
To simplify matters we omit labels for the obvious number of papers published, j = 1; 2, and R's sharing decision, m = share; never, in e¤orts, utilities and welfare under F P P .
First Paper Policy without Strategic Delay: Under F P P without strategic delay (N SD), R publishes the …rst paper in t = 1. She is required to share the data and does not compete with C in t = 2 (due to the competitive advantage that is captured in C's superior creativity). R's optimization problem is
R's maximization problem under N SD is the same as under 1-Share. The main di¤erence, however, is that she is forced to make the data available under F P P upon publication of the …rst paper. F P P is detrimental to R as it reduces her set of possible publication strategies.
The competitor C uses the data and publishes a paper in t = 2. C's optimization problem
The outcomes under N SD and 1-Share are identical for T = 0; 1; 2 and i = R; C, that is, e T;F P P N SD = e T;N P share
First Paper Policy with Strategic Delay: In contrast to the previous section, R may choose to delay her publications in order to fully exploit her data under F P P . In this case, she will incur the costs of completing the …rst and second paper in the …rst and second period, respectively. However, she will realize the total bene…ts associated with the publication of two papers in the second period, as she strategically delays publication in order to keep the data private. Under F P P with strategic delay (henceforth, SD), R does not publish in t = 1 but publishes the …rst and the second paper together in t = 2. R's optimization problem is
To understand R's optimization problem under SD, it is constructive to compare it with R's optimization problem under 2-share as given by (3). The second, third and fourth term is identical under both scenarios. The …rst term, however, is di¤erent if R is not perfectly patient, i.e., < 1. In contrast to 2-Share, R realizes the net value of the publication of the …rst paper at a later stage under SD. Under 2-Share, the …rst paper is published right after completion in the …rst stage whereas its publication is postponed to the second stage under SD. We obtain the following optimal e¤orts: e 0;F P P SD = 3 D
1;F P P SD = e 0;F P P SD 1 (1 + ) and e 2;F P P SD = e 0;F P P SD 1 c (1 + ). We obtain the following optimal utility (overall welfare): U R;F P P SD = W F P P SD = 1 2 e 0;F P P SD 3 D . Note that C does not generate any utility in this case. Overall welfare increases in D and and decreases in c and .
Analysis and Comparison of No Policy and First Paper Policy
We analyze the e¤ect of the transition from N P to F P P on R's e¤orts to create data. We obtain: 
The economic intuition behind these results is the following. (i)(1) Intuitively, if is su¢ ciently low, i.e. sharing the data would harm R signi…cantly, the transition to F P P reduces her incentives to create data in the …rst place independently of R's publication choice under N P . (i)(2) If 1-Never is optimal for R under N P , i.e. is su¢ ciently low, the transition to F P P reduces R's incentives to create the data. Then, the obligation to share reduces her returns from the data. Note, however, that the transition does not induce R to delay submission strategically in this case. (i)(3) Whenever R chooses to delay submission strategically under F P P and to share after two publications under N P , the transition to F P P reduces R's e¤orts to create data. Intuitively, both scenarios (2-Share under N P and SD under F P P ) lead to the same outcome in the sense that the data are available after two publications. However, R generates a lower (discounted) utility from the …rst publication under F P P with SD as compared to 2-Share under N P .
Under the conditions speci…ed in (ii), 1-Share is optimal for R under N P and N SD is optimal under F P P . The transition to F P P does not in ‡uence R's e¤ort to create data as she is indi¤erent between 1-Share under N P and N SD under F P P .
(iii) Our analysis suggests that the transition to F P P potentially increases R's e¤orts to create data under the following conditions: R is su¢ ciently patient to publish and is neither too low, i.e. data sharing is not too harmful, nor too high, i.e. R would not share data voluntarily under N P . However, the result that the transition to F P P may increase R's incentives to create data may seem counterintuitive as one may argue that the set of choices under F P P is a subset of the set of choices under N P . Note, however, that the transition to F P P does not make R better o¤ in terms of utility. It forces R to adjust her optimal e¤ort choice, which ceteris paribus turns out to be e¤ort-increasing under the conditions speci…ed in (iii).
We provide the exact conditions under which R …nds it optimal to delay submission strategically under F P P in the following proposition. Intuitively, if R is su¢ ciently patient, the additional bene…ts from the second publication more than outweigh the delayed realization of the bene…ts from the …rst paper under SD as compared to N SD. Regarding the interpretation of this proposition, note that junior researchers are typically more impatient than senior researchers because they are in need of a good publication soon in order to obtain a tenured position (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Gans and Stern, 2010 ). Hence, one may interpret Proposition 3 in the sense that junior researchers are ceteris paribus less likely to strategically delay their submission than senior (tenured) researchers. However, it is also reasonable to assume that the value of an additional publication in terms of career concerns is higher for (untenured) junior researchers than for (tenured) senior researchers for the same reason (Coupé et al., 2006; Siegfried and White, 1973; Tuckman and Leahey, 1973) . 8 This would make SD relatively more attractive to young scholars. Hence, the question of whether junior researchers have lower incentives than senior researchers to delay strategically depends on whether the "impatience e¤ect" dominates the countervailing "marginal publication e¤ect" under the assumption that the rate of data depreciation does not di¤er between junior and senior researchers.
Welfare Analysis
We analyze the welfare properties of the transition to F P P . The precise conditions under which this transition has neutral, negative or positive welfare properties are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Welfare e¤ects Transition to F P P (i) does not in ‡uence welfare if the Researcher chooses to share after one publication, which is the case when 1 and the Researcher is not very patient, i.e. h 1 , where h 1 = h 1 ( ) depends negatively on , or when h 1 and h h 1 . (ii) (1) It increases welfare if lw < 1 and l < < h 0 := minf h ; h SD g, where lw = lw ( ) depends negatively on and both l = l ( ; ) and h 0 = h 0 ( ; ) depend negatively both on and , or (2) if l 3 < < h 1 and 0 1 < < minf h SD ; 0 0 g, where l 3 ( ) and h 1 ( ) depend negatively on . (iii) It reduces welfare when is su¢ ciently small, i.e. < l 1 , where l 1 = l 1 ( ) depends negatively on , or if the Researcher is very patient, i.e. > h SD .
The economic intuition behind these results is the following. (i) 1-Share under N P and N SD under F P P lead to the same outcome from a social welfare perspective. Both researchers are indi¤erent between N P and F P P .
(ii) (1) Under these conditions, R switches from 1-Never under N P to N SD under F P P . The welfare gain due to the additional paper published by C under F P P more than outweighs the potentially negative impact of forced data sharing on R.
(2) R switches from 2-Never to N SD under F P P while is su¢ ciently high. (iii) These results specify the conditions under which the transition to F P P has negative welfare properties. First, the transition to F P P reduces welfare if it induces R to delay submission strategically. If R delays strategically, two negative e¤ects emerge: There will be a delay in the time the scienti…c knowledge is made public and C cannot use the data to publish his (higher value) paper. Analytically, it can be shown that R's utility under the conditions which incentivize her to choose 2-Share under N P always exceeds her utility under SD under F P P . In addition, for all combinations of and for which 2-Share is not chosen under N P , it is dominated by one of the other strategies under N P . Therefore, SD is not only dominated by 2-Share but also by all other possible strategies under N P . Thus, the transition to SD always decreases R's utility and thus overall welfare independent of the researcher's strategy under N P . Second, for su¢ ciently low , the transition to F P P reduces welfare if it forces R to switch from never sharing after the …rst or second publication under N P to not delaying strategically. In this case, the negative e¤ect of the transition to F P P on the constrained R more than outweighs its positive e¤ect on C. Forced data sharing associated with the transition to F P P is not a recommendable policy option under the conditions speci…ed in (iii). It is a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for positive welfare properties of forced data sharing that the implementation of F P P is complemented by other policies which deter strategic delay, such as career incentives. Figure 2 illustrates R's choices and the e¤ects of the transition from N P to F P P depending on the impatience rate, (vertical axis), and the ratio of data values after all publications in case of disclosure/nondisclosure, The light blue area indicates those combinations of and for which the transition from N P to F P P is welfare reducing. The light yellow area indicates combinations for which the transition to F P P increases welfare. 9 As for the white zone, which is exactly the zone where R chooses 1-Share under N P , the transition to F P P does not change welfare (Proposition 4(i)). Finally, the checked areas (always bordered by red lines on one side) indicate where the transition to F P P increases e¤orts to create the data. Most notably, Figure 2 suggests that there is scope for a socially bene…cial transition to F P P that increases the e¤ort to create data, as indicated by the overlapping checked and light yellow areas. E¤orts do not change after transition to F P P in the white zone and decrease everywhere else (Proposition 2). Strategic delay under F P P is unambiguously welfare reducing. On the basis of our …ndings and the fact that an institutional response is highly needed to increase data sharing (Dasgupta and David, 1994) we believe that mandatory data disclosure policies are necessary. However, they may be implemented along with higher incentives to share data in order to prevent the creator of the data from choosing to delay her submissions and decrease the e¤ort in data generation. If such incentives are not implemented younger researchers who have a higher impatience to publish and possibly have larger cost of data creation because of inexperience and lack of research assistants might have to carry the greatest burden from mandatory data disclosure.
Graphical Approximation of the Main Results
Policy Recommendations
Data Journals and Citations
As the social value of knowledge increases by sharing the data one variable which can be changed by policy makers is the value of the data for their creator after the last publication if she discloses the data, D (see Proposition 1). In particular, D could be the increasing value of data citations 10 on academic reputation. 11 In this respect, policy-makers and research funding agencies might incentivize and support the establishment of data journals. The establishment of data journals in economics may create a market for the exchange of data and increase the value of a data set for its creator and the availability of data. 12 This may also increase the quality of available data if data publications are subject to a peer-review process. Lessons could be learned from other disciplines. For instance, Nature (2013) has announced the launch of the online data journal Scienti…c Data. Moreover, the online-only Geoscience Data Journal has recently been launched (Allan, 2012) . In addition, incentive schemes rewarding the production and documentation of data (Fienberg et al., 1985) , such as a new standard of data citation (Altman and King, 2007) , should be implemented so that sharing becomes more valuable to the original creator of data. Examples of recently established tools for data retention and citation are, among others, Dryad, Figshare and Zenodo. In general, if the individual academic value of data increases, i.e. due to data journals and increased and more valuable data citations, some researchers may have an incentive to specialize in the creation of data if they expect to have a competitive advantage, i.e. they have the necessary (…nancial) resources, knowledge and experience in the creation of data. This may have a positive e¤ect on the overall quality of available data.
Journals for Replication Studies
As the publication market for replication studies in economics is limited, investing time and e¤ort in writing a replication study is not an e¢ cient use of a researcher's resources (Hamermesh, 1997; McCullough et al., 2006; Mirowski and Sklivas, 1991) . However, the establishment of journals for replication studies may induce more researchers to engage in this …eld. The establishment of such journals could strengthen our so-called -e¤ect of data sharing on the value of published articles. It would increase the ex ante incentives to produce correct results as authors will anticipate that their papers might be subject to the scrutiny of replicators. This would be bene…cial for the academic community as incorrect results could be removed from the cumulative body of knowledge. The data creating author may also bene…t ex post as replication may increase the credibility of her work. In addition, we hypothesize that replication studies could be particularly bene…cial for junior researchers, i.e. PhD candidates or Master students on a research track, due to learning e¤ects. For instance, supervising professors may require their Master students or PhD candidates to actively contribute to such journals under their guidance. Replication studies would teach junior researchers the responsible treatment of data and put additional pressure on senior researchers to generate correct data in the …rst place (Feigenbaum and Levy, 1993; McCullough et al., 2006 ).
Possible Actions for Universities
First, universities could reward data sharing behavior through additional research grants or by positively considering sharing in a researchers'career. For instance, status-and prioritybased rewards such as tenure and prizes for outstanding achievements may incentivize researchers to disclose their data (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Fienberg et al., 1985; Gans and Stern, 2010; Mukherjee and Stern, 2009 ). Second, universities could promote data sharing through institutional assistance. According to Kim and Stanton (2012) , the compilation, preparation and sharing of research data are perceived as costly, thereby preventing researchers from sharing their data. Reducing these obstacles could result in a higher net bene…t of sharing data and help to generate a pro-data-sharing attitude. For instance, some universities have recently taken the lead in this respect by developing data repositories and structured guidance for the creation of data management plans (Andreoli-Versbach and Mueller-Langer, forthcoming).
Conclusion
We set up a simple model describing the incentives of a researcher to generate novel data, publish articles and share her data with the research community so that other researchers can use the data for subsequent empirical research. We compare two di¤erent policies. First, under "No Policy", the creator of data has complete freedom as when to share her data voluntarily. Second, under the "First Paper Policy", she is required to share the data immediately after her …rst publication.
The implementation of First Paper Policy may distort her incentives in two fundamental ways. First, she might strategically delay her submissions in order to continue publishing with the same data without making it available to others. Second, she might reduce her e¤ort to create data as she would not be the full residual claimant of her data after the …rst publication. Strategic delaying would prevent other researchers from working on related subsequent research with the same data. The decision to delay the time of submission depends on three factors. The …rst of these is the impatience to publish of the data-creating researcher (as given by the discount factor); the second is the value of the data, i.e. the more valuable the data the higher is the probability that the researcher will choose to delay her submissions. The …nal factor is how fast the value of the data depreciates as the number of publications increases.
Our welfare analysis suggests that a mandatory data disclosure policy has negative welfare properties if it induces the researcher to strategically delay the submission of subsequent papers. Under this scenario the research community would not be in a position to make use of the data when it is still valuable for further research. Mandatory data disclosure may only be welfare enhancing if researchers have no incentives to postpone the time of their publication and if the positive e¤ect of data availability outweighs the negative e¤ect associated with reduced e¤orts to create data. We conclude that the implementation of mandatory data sharing rules should be complemented by other policies that deter strategic delay, such as career incentives, and increase the stand-alone value of academic data, such as new standards for data citation and the establishment of data journals. We also recommend the establishment of journals for replication studies in economics.
As a …rst idea for further research, we suggest relaxing the implicit assumption that the two researchers never work on independent papers (with the same topic) at the same time. This is particularly likely under the First Paper Policy and may result in a socially wasteful duplication of research e¤orts.
Finally, as a publication in a top-tier economics journal is highly desired by most researchers and might lead to promotion within a university, the bene…ts of a publication are likely to outweigh the cost of data sharing. It is questionable whether this result holds for medium-ranked journals with a data availability policy, where authors may choose competing journals with similar ranking but without a data availability policy. The …rst-order conditions (FOCs) are given by @U R;N P share 1 @e 0 = 0 ) e 1 1 (1 + ) + 2 D = e 0 (e 1 ) ; @U R;N P share 1 @e 1 = 0 ) e 0 1 (1 + ) = e 1 (e 0 ) :
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Appendix C: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 0: Since the denominators of optimal e¤orts depend negatively on , the e¤orts are positive for all 2 (0; 1] if all of the following conditions hold:
It is clear that conditions (1), (2) and (4) hold whenever condition (3) or, equivalently, (5) holds. We can rewrite (3) as
Proof of Proposition 1: We …rst show that for 1 it always holds that U R;N P share 
which holds whenever = D N D
1.
The second inequality is (1 + ) 2 c 2 2
The …rst derivative of LHS with respect to is
We compute LHS 0 (0) = 1 2 < 0 and LHS 0 (1) = 2(1 + )
because positive e¤orts imply 1+ 2 < 1 (see (4) ). The derivative of LHS 0 with respect to is monotone as the derivative of any quadratic function and we conclude that LHS( ) is monotonically decreasing for all 2 [0; 1]. Accordingly, h 1 2 (0; 1) is well-de…ned as the …rst positive root of LHS( ) = 0, i.e. for
Now by the proof of Proposition 1, for
1 and h 1 the Researcher will choose to share after one publication under N P . Whenever the Researcher chooses to share after one publication under N P , she also chooses not to delay strategically under F P P . We show this indirectly, proving that sharing after 2 publications strictly dominates strategic delay. This would imply that the Researcher will not choose strategic delay, because she does not choose sharing even after 2 publications. U N P share 2 U F P P SD is equivalent to
which is true for all 2 (0; 1].
Since sharing after one publication is the same as not delaying strategically, it is clear that for 1 and h 1 and, analogously, for those cases where < 1 and the Researcher chooses to share after one publication under N P , transition to F P P does not in ‡uence welfare. We …rst show the dependence of h 1 ( ) on and then discuss the case < 1.
Consider LHS( ) for a …xed as the function of and , denoting it LHS ( ; ). Notice that @LHS ( ; ) @ = 3 2
So the function LHS( ) is pointwise monotone decreasing in . Since LHS( ) is monotonically decreasing in point h 1 , it follows that h 1 ( ) depends negatively on .
For the case < 1 we aim to …nd conditions on and under which the utility of sharing after one publication is higher than other utilities. First, we already know from the beginning of this proof that U R;N P share 1 U R;N P share 2 for h 1 . Second, we know from the proof of Proposition 1 that for
it holds that U R;N P share 2 U R;N P never 2 . So for h 1 < 1 and h 1 the Researcher chooses to make one publication and then either to share or not to share. As we know from the proof of Proposition 1(ii) (see (13) ), this last choice is met in favour of sharing in case
Now 0 0 (1) = 0 and 0 0 0 ( ) =
for > 0. Since h 1 does not depend on , there exists some h 2 such that 0 0 h 1 for every h 2 . De…ning h := maxf h 1 ; h 2 g we get that the Researcher chooses to share after one publication if h 1 and 0 0 h 1 . Under these conditions 0 0 = h , since the relevant term in the de…nition of h is exactly 0 0 . We get the statement.
(ii) (1) By Proposition 3 and the proof of Proposition 1 (ii), we know, that if l < 1 and < h 0 := minf h ; h SD g, the Researcher will choose to publish one paper and never share under N P or not to delay strategically under F P P . We also already know the dependence of l ( ) and h 0 ( ; ) on and . We now show the existence of l and lw such that for lw < 1 and l < < h 0 it holds that W F P P N SD > W N P never 1 . The last expression is equivalent to 
are monotone increasing and since 2 is also monotone increasing, RHS( ) is monotonically decreasing in .
We conclude that for all f with RHS(1) < 2 f 1 there exists l such that W F P P N SD > W N P never 1 holds for every f < < 1 and l < 1. De…ne lw := maxf p RHS(1); l g. For = 1 it holds 2 RHS( ) for all 0 < 1, so the set of points ( ; ) with lw < 1 and l < < h 0 is always nonempty. Finally, from Proposition 1 l ( ) depends negatively on and it is easy to see that the same holds for RHS(1).
(2) There might be a case where 0 1 < < minf h SD ; 0 0 g and < h 1 , i.e. the Researcher chooses to never share after two publications under N P or not to delay strategically under F P P . Therefore, we consider W F P P N SD > W N P never 2 . From this, we obtain 
Denoting the term on the r.h.s. l 3 ( ; ), we obtain that F P P increases welfare if 0 1 < < minf h SD ; 0 0 g and l 3 < < h 1 . It is easy to see that l 3 ( ) depends negatively on . Finally, we provide a numerical example which suggests that W F P P N SD > W N P share 2 if h 1 < < h SD . For c = = 1:5 and = 0:2 (see Figure 2 ), it is straightforward to see that W F P P N SD > W N P share 2 if h 1 = 0:8171 < < h SD = 0:8824. (iii) As we have seen in part (i) of this proof, sharing after two publications strictly dominates strategic delay. This means that whenever the Researcher chooses to delay strategically under F P P , she could have been better o¤ under N P (even if she would not choose sharing after two publications in this case, as some other N P option could in its turn dominate sharing after two publications). Since W N P share 2 = U N P share 2 and W F P P SD = U F P P SD , this means that F P P reduces welfare if the Researcher chooses to delay strategically under it, i.e. if > h SD . Now recall from the proof of Proposition 1, (ii), that there exists some h such that for < h 1-Never is the dominant strategy under N P . It follows that for < minf h ; h SD g the Researcher chooses to never share after one publication under N P or not to delay strategically under F P P . From (32) we …nd out that if 
then W F P P N SD < W N P never 1 . That is, for < l 0 and < minf h ; h SD g transition to F P P reduces welfare. l 0 ( ) depends nonpositively on .
There may remain a case where 0 1 < < minf h SD ; 0 0 g and < h 1 , i.e. the Researcher chooses to never share after two publications under N P or not to delay strategically under F P P . We consider the inequality W F P P N SD < W N P never 2 by taking l 3 ( ) from (35) into account.
Together we get that F P P is welfare reducing when < l 1 ( ) := 8 < : l 0 ( ); < minf h ; h SD g l 3 ( ); 0 1 < < minf h SD ; 0 0 g and < h 1
. Proof of Proposition 2: (i) (1) We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that for < l the Researcher chooses to never share and decides to publish two papers if and only if > 0 1 . From Proposition 3, transition to F P P urges the Researcher to delay strategically if and only if > h SD . We now compare the e¤orts to create a data set for di¤erent combinations of Researcher's decisions. 
It follows that for le < < 1 and < he ( ; ) := min h ( ; ); h SD ( ); 2 (1 ) (1 + ) 2 (45) transition to F P P reduces e¤orts to create data set. As 0 1 does not depend on or , h ( ; ) depends negatively on both of them and h SD ( ) depends negatively on and does not depend on , he ( ; ) obviously depends nonpositively on and on as well, since
(3) We want to show that transition to F P P reduces e¤orts to create data set if > h = maxf h 1 ; h 2 g and > maxf h 1 ; h SD g. In this case, the Researcher chooses to delay strategically under F P P (since > h SD ) or to share after 2 publications under N P .
To prove the last statement recall the arguments from the proof of Proposition 4(i). For > h 1 it holds that U R;N P share (1 + ) 2 > 2 (1 + ) 2 , 1 + 2 + 2 2 > 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 , 1 + 2 > ( + 2 ) ;
which is true for all 2 (0; 1]. So whenever the Researcher chooses to delay strategically under F P P and to share after 2 publications under N P , transition to F P P reduces e¤orts to create data set.
(ii) Transition to F P P does not in ‡uence e¤orts to create data set whenever the Researcher chooses to share after one publication under N P and not to delay strategically under F P P , i.e. whenever transition to F P P does not in ‡uence welfare (see Proposition 4(i)).
(iii)(1) As we know from the proof of Proposition 1 and from Proposition 3, for < 1 and < min f h ; h SD g the Researcher chooses to never share after one publication under N P or not to delay strategically under F P P . From the de…nition of he (see (45) ) it follows that if he < < min f h ; h SD g, then transition to F P P increases e¤orts to create data set. We show that for > 0 there always exist such s.
Consider < 1 near to 1 and small . As was shown in the proof of Proposition 4(i) (see text after equation (29)), with these parameters the Researcher chooses to make one publication and then either to share or not to share, so that the relevant condition in min f h ; h SD g is U R;N P never (1 + ) 2 2 ;
(48) since 0 1 and h SD are positive and do not depend on , whereas 0 0 (1) = 0.
Notice that for = 1 it holds that he = 0. So both 0 0 ( ) and he ( ) continuously approach 0 as ! 1. In the neighborhood of = 1 it holds that 0 0 ( ) > he ( ), since
(1 + ) 2 (1 + ) 2 2 + 3 > (1 + ) 2
2
(1 + ) 2 + 3 ,
which is true for > 0.
For < le transition to F P P reduces e¤orts to create data set (see this Proposition, (i)(1)) and it follows that for le < < 1 and he < < min f h ; h SD g transition to F P P increases e¤orts to create data set.
(2) For < h 1 (see (29) ) and > max f 0 1 ; h SD ; h 1 g the Researcher chooses to never share after two publications under N P or to delay strategically under F P P . Further we know from this proof, (i) (1) , that in this case F P P increases e¤orts to create data set if and only if 
Since a square root of a number between 0 and 1 is bigger than the number itself, for = 1 and > 0 it holds ule < h 1 . It follows that F P P increases e¤orts to create a data set when ule ( ) < < h 1 and > max f 0 1 ; h SD ; h 1 g, whereby the set of such ( ; ) is always nonempty.
